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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court erred by permitting evidence of

Plaintiff's prior personal injury lawsuit and the amount of the
settlement of that lawsuit over the objection of Plaintiff's
counsel.
The trial court's ruling regarding the relevance of evidence
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Harrison. 805
P.2d 769 (Utah App.) cert, denied (Utah 1991).
2.

Whether admitting evidence of Plaintiff's prior personal

injury lawsuit and the amount of the settlement was plain error and
must be reversed.
When plain error is asserted, the trial court's evidentiary
rulings are reviewed to determine whether it should have been
obvious to the trial court that it was committing error. State v.
Elm. 808 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence applies to this matter
and is set forth in full in the appendix of this brief.

In

relevant part, the rule provides:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected, and

1

(1) Objection.
In case the ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears
of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if
the specific ground was not apparent from the context, or
•

*

*

(d) Plain error.
Nothing in this rule precludes taking
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although
they were not brought to the attention of the court.
U.R.E., Rule 103(a) and Rule 103(d), Appendix 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises as a result of a two car automobile accident
in Murray, Utah in 1993. Plaintiff Debra Larsen was rear-ended by
Defendant Melinda Johnson. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff
injured her back.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
During the discovery and at trial, Plaintiff disclosed that in
1988 she was injured in an auto accident.

Plaintiff further

testified that she had physically, fully recovered from the 1988
accident. Her treating physician also testified that she had fully
recovered from the 1988 accident prior to the accident at issue.
On cross-examination by Defendant's counsel, Plaintiff was
asked questions regarding the legal proceedings arising out of the
1988 accident. Plaintiff was asked whether she had filed a lawsuit
as a result of the 1988 accident.
amount of the settlement.

2

Plaintiff was also asked the

Over the Plaintiff counsel's preserved objection, the trial
court admitted evidence of Plaintiff's prior lawsuit and the amount
of the settlement resulting from her 1988 accident.
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT
The

jury

negligent.

returned

a verdict

See Appendix

2.

finding

the

However, the

Defendant

jury

was

found that

Defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of Plaintiff's
injuries and awarded no damages.

Id.

The trial court entered a

judgment for Defendant based on the verdict.
Plaintiff timely appealed the matter.

See Appendix 3.

See Appendix 4.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

This lawsuit arises out of an automobile accident in

which Defendant, Melinda Johnson struck Plaintiff, Debra Larsen's
automobile from behind on May 12, 1993.
2.

See R. 1-5.

Plaintiff admitted freely at trial that she had been

involved in a prior accident in 1988 in which she sustained
injuries and which required back surgery.
3.

See R. 360, 362-368.

Plaintiff's treating physician for both accidents, Dr.

Reed Fogg, testified that Plaintiff suffered significant additional
injuries to her back as a result of the second collision.

See R.

503.
4.

Further, Plaintiff presented competent evidence that at

the time of the second accident she had recovered fully from her
prior injuries.

See R. 490-492.

3

5.

Defendant's own medical expert did not dispute the fact

that Plaintiff had fully recovered from the 1988 accident based on
his review of the records.
6.

During

See R. 713.

cross-examination,

Defendant's

counsel

asked

Plaintiff about the prior litigation and whether she had settled
the lawsuit arising out of the 1988 accident. Defendant's counsel
also asked Plaintiff to verify the amount of the settlement as
follows:
Q:

Is it true that you received $172,000.00 in settlement of
your claims in that lawsuit?

See R. 441.

See also Appendix 5.

At that time, Defendant's counsel made the following objection
on the record:
Mr. Plant:

Your honor, Just for the record I would lodge
an objection for relevance.

The Court:

The objection is noted. It's overruled.

See R. 441, See Appendix 5.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error by admitting
irrelevant evidence of the fact of Plaintiff's prior lawsuit and
the amount of the settlement obtained in that action. The fact of
a prior suit and the amount of settlement in the context of this
case are irrelevant, prejudicial, and should not have been admitted
into evidence.

Plaintiff properly preserved her objection in the

record before the trial court.
4

The case law also indicates that admitting irrelevant evidence
of prior lawsuits and settlements constitute plain error and is
prejudicial on its face.

Reversal of the trial Court's judgment

and an order for a new trial should be ordered in this case.
ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF
PLAINTIFF'S PREVIOUS LAWSUIT AND THE AMOUNT OF SETTLEMENT
AMOUNT BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE WAS IRRELEVANT, CONSTITUTED
PLAIN ERROR, AND WAS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL.
The first issue to be determined by this Court is whether the
evidence was admissible.

See U.R.E., Rule 104(a).

After that

decision is made, this Court must examine whether there was a
timely objection, or, alternatively, whether the failure to exclude
the evidence was plain error.
1215 (Utah 1986);

See State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d

State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990).

Finally, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the effect of the trial
court's error was prejudicial, potentially altering the outcome of
the case.
A.

Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976).
Evidence of Prior Suits and Settlement Amounts was
Clearly Irrelevant and Inadmissible in the Context of the
Case Constituting an Abuse of Discretion by the Trial
Court.

According to the Utah Rules of Evidence, "Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible."

See U.R.E., Rule 402. Relevant

evidence is defined as, "evidence having a tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more or less probable than it would be without the
5

evidence."

See U.R.E., Rule 401. Ordinarily, the trial court has

discretion in determining whether evidence is relevant. Bambrough
v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). However, where the evidence
is clearly or plainly irrelevant, the Court will be deemed to have
abused its discretion.

See Terry v. Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah

1979) overruled on other grounds MacFarland v. Skaggs Cos. Inc.,
678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).

The trial court in this case abused its

discretion by admitting evidence of Plaintiff's prior lawsuit and
settlement amount because such evidence was completely irrelevant
to any issue to be weighed or resolved by the jury.
In King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court
held that in a limited context a plaintiff could, on redirect
examination, explain previous injuries and testify as to settlement
amounts received in suits arising out of those injuries.

Id. at

979. However, the Supreme Court recognized that when the defendant
affirmatively attempts to introduce evidence of prior suits or
settlement amounts, the situation is entirely different. The King
Court further recognized that most courts in other jurisdictions do
not allow the evidence of prior lawsuits and settlements to be
presented to the jury.
The

Court

Id. at 978.

in King

cited

with

approval

Worthington

v.

Caldwell, 396 P.2d 797 (Wash. 1964), which held that settlement
amounts and the even the fact of a prior, unrelated lawsuit should
not be allowed into evidence.

In Worthington, the plaintiff was

involved in an auto accident.

Three years later she was involved
6

in a second accident in which she was reinsured.

In the course of

her suit arising out of the second accident, the plaintiff was
examined by the defendant's medical expert.
second

accident,

the

defendant's

expert

During trial of the
testified

that

the

plaintiff had told the expert she had settled the previous lawsuit
for $4,000.

id. at 800.

The plaintiff immediately moved for a

mistrial, but his motion was denied.

On appeal, the Washington

Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial
stating, "proof of the amount of settlement for personal injuries
incurred in an automobile accident three years earlier was clearly
irrelevant and immaterial as to the injuries sustained then and
now, and, thus, had no probative value."

Id. at 801 (emphasis

added).
As in Worthincrton, the Defendant in this case improperly asked
specific questions regarding Plaintiff's prior, unrelated lawsuit
and settlement amounts obtained therein.

See R. 441.

Despite

Plaintiff's objection, the trial court allowed Defendant to delve
into specific evidence of the previous lawsuit and the amount of
the settlement Plaintiff obtained.

Jd.

As in Worthinaton, the

trial court in this case committed clear error by admitting such
evidence because the evidence was patently irrelevant and had no
probative value.

Cf. Id. at 801.

In Defendant's motion for summary disposition, she argued that
Utah Courts have "clearly and plainly affirmed the right of a
defendant to bring before the jury the nature and extent of the
7

previous back injury, including the amount that she was paid in
settlement."

See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for

Summary Disposition, p. 6 (emphasis added)• Defendant cites Kelsey
v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 264 Minn. 49, 117 N.W.2d
559 (1962), also cited in King, as being dispositive.
979.

See King at

However, according to King, Kelsey merely holds that "the

plaintiff would be able, on redirect examination, to explain the
resolution of a prior claim." King at 979. Kelsey, does not stand
for the proposition that a defendant may, without restriction,
introduce irrelevant evidence of previous lawsuits and settlements.
Defendant has also argued that Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d
437 (Utah 1989) supports the notion that previous law suits and
settlements should be admitted when they involve injuries to the
same area of the body.

Defendant's reliance on the Slusher

decision is entirely misplaced. Slusher involved a settlement with
one of many defendants in a multi-party case.

Id. at 439.

defendants were all alleged to be joint tortfeasors.

The

The Utah

Supreme Court held that in such cases, the trial court should
inform the jury of the terms of the settlement agreement with the
dismissed parties.

The purpose of the disclosure is to fully

inform the jury regarding why the dismissed party is no longer in
the action and why the plaintiff thereafter has an incentive to
cast the entire blame on the non-settling parties. See Id.
The Slusher decision is inapposite to this case on its facts
and legal principles. In this case, Defendant is not a joint tort8

feasor with other settling defendants. Moreover, the two accidents
in this case are unrelated in any way except that the injury which
the Plaintiff suffered is similar. Also, there is no dispute that
the Plaintiff fully described the nature and extent of the first
injury at trial.

Therefore, there is no basis for a claim that

Plaintiff concealed the extent of her prior injury from the jury,
which might warrant use of the evidence for impeachment.
A

far more

applicable

case

than

Slusher

is

Nepple

v.

Weifenbach, 274 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1979). In Nepple the Iowa Supreme
Court surveyed the case law addressing the introduction of evidence
of prior lawsuits and settlement amounts where the plaintiff does
not deny or attempt to hide prior injures.

Jd. at 733.

Nepple

states:
We conclude that the better-reasoned authorities hold
that evidence of the amounts of prior settlements is
inadmissible. . . . There was no denial by the plaintiff of
any prior injuries. It is likely that the prior settlements
included such items as loss of earnings and medical expense;
and in the case of the plaintiff's tort claim, the additional
items of pain and suffering.
None of these would have a
direct bearing on what injuries plaintiff had suffered which
were still in existence at the time of the injury.
The size of the verdict or settlement may vary according
to factors having no bearing on the extent of residual
injuries.
For example, close issues of liability might
diminish the recovery; shocking acts of recklessness or
negligence might increase them. Disputed legal issues and
other obvious factors, such as the ability of the claimant's
attorney, could affect them.
Nepple v. Weifenbach, 274 N.W.2d 728, 733 (Iowa 1979).

Similarly

the Court in Beil v. Mayer, 789 P.2d 1229 (Mont. 1990), held that
9

it was reversible error to admit evidence regarding the fact of a
prior, unrelated lawsuit and settlement amount.
B.

The Objection was Preserved in the Record.

One of the requirements for asserting error in the admission
of evidence is a preserved objection on the record.
Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986).

State v.

In this case there is no

genuine dispute that Plaintiff's counsel specifically objected to
the evidence based on "relevance."

See R. 441, Appendix 5.

Therefore, the objection was properly preserved on the record and
may be addressed by this Court on Appeal. See State v. Carter. 707
P.2d 656 (Utah 1985).
C.

Admitting Evidence of the Prior Lawsuit and Settlement
was Plain Error.

Even assuming that the objection in this case was insufficient
to preserve the issues on appeal, if the error was so plain that
the

trial

court

should

have

known

that

the

inadmissible, it will be deemed reversible error.

evidence

was

State v. Ross,

782 P.2d 529 (Utah App. 1989). As explained above, the fact of and
amount of a prior settlement in an unrelated subsequent litigation
is completely irrelevant to any issue to be tried.
section "A". The error is therefore, manifest.

See supra

It would be plain

to any court that the evidence of a prior suit or settlement is not
probative of any issue, nor will it assist the trier of fact to
resolve any dispute before the trial court.

Therefore, it should

have been obvious to the trial court that its decision to allow
10

evidence of the facts of the prior lawsuit and the amount of the
settlement was erroneous at the time. Because the error was plain,
the case must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
D.

Admitting the Irrelevant Evidence Resulted in Prejudice
to Plaintiff.

In order for an evidentiary error to warrant reversal, the
error must prejudice the party against whom the evidence was
introduced.

See Downey State Bank v. Maior-Blakeney Corp., 578

P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978); U.R.C.P.# Rule 61.
introduction

of

evidence

of

the

fact of

In this case, the
and

amount

of the

settlement was certainly a potential part of the reason the jury
found that Defendant was negligent, but not the proximate cause of
the damages incurred by Plaintiff.
The Montana Supreme Court in Beil held not only was it error
to admit the evidence of prior suits and settlements, but that the
error could not be considered harmless. In Beil, reversal of a new
trial was ordered even though the jury found that the defendant was
not negligent. See Id. at 1234. In this case, in contrast to Beil,
the jury actually found the defendant was negligent.

Therefore,

the error in this case was much more likely to have influenced the
jury's decision regarding proximate cause.
The Nepple case also addressed the inherent prejudicial effect
of

admitting

evidence

regarding

prior

lawsuits

because

such

evidence tends to cause a jury to view the plaintiff in a negative
light:
11

Lowenthal v. Mortimer . . . concerned evidence of prior
lawsuits by plaintiff. The court stated that "litigiousness,
in the eyes of most people, reflects . . . upon character" and
that "hostility [is] ordinarily felt against one who
constantly requires services of a court of law for the
adjustment of life's problems." The court held it was
reversible error to allow evidence of the prior matters.
Nepple, at 733 (quoting Lowenthal v. Mortimer, 125 Cal.App.2d 636,
642-643, 270 P.2d 942, 945-946 (1954)).
In this case, evidence of both the previous lawsuit and the
amount of settlement were presented to the jury by the Defendant.
As pointed out by Nepple, the evidence was prejudicial not only
because it was entirely irrelevant to any issue in the case, but it
tended to reflect negatively on Debra Larsen's character, which was
not an issue in this case. See Beil, at 1232.

This case, unlike

King, does not involve a plaintiff attempting to explain a previous
injury. This case involves a defendant attempting to affirmatively
discredit a plaintiff by introducing evidence that the plaintiff
had previously exercised her right to obtain relief in court and
the result of that attempt.
In light of the evidence presented by Plaintiff's treating
physician regarding causation and the lack of evidence rebutting
causation offered by Defendant, there is a reasonable likelihood
that the outcome of the trial was affected. Plaintiff asserts that
the jury was swayed by the improper injection of the prejudicial
and irrelevant evidence regarding Plaintiff's prior lawsuit and
settlement.
demonstrating

Plaintiff has therefore, met her burden on appeal by
that

the

error

caused
12

prejudice

to

her

and

potentially affected the outcome of the trial. Cf. Beil, at 1232;
see also Joseph v. W. H. Groves L.D.S. Hospital, 318 P.2d 330 (Utah
1957).
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding the
prior, unrelated lawsuit and settlement amount. Allowing evidence
of the Plaintiff's previous lawsuit and settlement was plain error,
prejudicial, and was an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Reversal and a new trial are the only proper remedy for the error.
DATED this £>^

day of August, 1997.

HANSON. EPPERSON & WALLACE

TE£RY
Attorrig^r f&r Plaintiff/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 103

ARTICLE I.
GENERAL PROVISIONS.
gule 101. Scope.
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this State, to the extent and
with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101.
Advisory Committee Note. — Adapted
from Rule 101, Uniform Rules of Evidence
(1974). Rule 1101 contains exceptions dealing
with preliminary questions of fact, grand jury
proceedings, miscellaneous judicial or quasi-judiciai proceedings and summary contempt proceedings. Rule 101 and H01 are comparable to
Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1971),
except that Rule 2 made applicable other procedural rules (i.e., cml/criminal) or applicable
i- *«- +~ *u« A~+A~t+u«+ +u«„ ~*i— +ul w,,i«statutes to the extent that they relax the Rules
of Evidence. In addition, Rule 2 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971) expressly made the
rules applicable to both civil and criminal procee( ^ n gg
Rule 101 adopts a general policy making the
NOTES TO
Bail hearings.
The former Utah Rules of Evidence were applicable to and controlling at bail hearings.
COLLATERAL

Rules of Evidence applicable in all instances in
courts of the state including situations previously governed by statute, except to the extent
that specific statutory provisions are expressly
retained. Rule 101 also rejects Lopes v. Lopes,
30 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974) to the
^ h o c development of
e x t e n t that
i t vermita
^
g ^
o f ^ ^ i n c ( m i i 8 t t I l t ^Ih
ihMB
j ^ ^ of Evidenc8.
m,
...-.,
. . Qf ,
w.,,™,
T*16 position of the court in btate v. Hansen,
. flfl 0 *\ 1flA m . , 1Q7Q^ f . . , , , , w ^ ^ .
588 R2
* l«f (Utah 1978) that statutory• pnm^
of evidence law mconsistent with the
^^ *"* t a k e Precedence is rejected.
Cross-References. — Evidence generally,
§ 78-25-2 et seq.; Rule 43, U.R.C.P.
DECISIONS
Chynoweth v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081 (Utah
1977).

Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 68.
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part II, 1987
Utah L. Rev. 467.

Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for Judiciai Analysis and Reform, 1992 Utah L. Rev.
67.

REFERENCES

Rule 102. Purpose and construction.
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 102 is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is an adjuration
as to the purpose of the Rules of Evidence.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah
1986); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1986).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130.

Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part HI,
1995 Utah L. Rev. 683.

Rule 103. Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked

Rule 103
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(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making
of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 103 is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in conformity
with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and Utah case law not involving constitutional
considerations. Subsection (a)(1) is in accord
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
and Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 Utah 2d
421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). See also Bradford v.
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980);

Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah
1981). Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plain
error rule. See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441
P.2d 512 (1968).
Cross-References* — Harmless error in admission or exclusion of evidence, Rule 61,
U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability.
Bench trial.
Erroneous rulings.
—Cumulative evidence.
—Exclusion.
—Harmless error.
—Objection.
—Offer of proof.
—Substantial right or prejudice.
—Waiver.
Plain error.
Purpose.
Cited.
Applicability.
Adequacy under Subdivision (a)(2) of plaintiffs proffer of expert testimony was irrelevant
where the trial court's exclusion of the testimony was a case management decision and the
substance of the testimony had no bearing on
the court's decision, because the exclusion of
testimony was not an evidentiary ruling to
which Subdivision (a)(2) would apply. Berrett
v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992).
Bench trial.
When a trial is to a court, the rulings on
evidence are not of such critical moment as
when a trial is to a jury, because it is to be
assumed that the court has, and will use, its
superior knowledge as to competency and the
effect which should be given evidence. Super
Tire Mkt., Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417
P.2d 132 (1966).
Erroneous rulings.
—Cumulative evidence.
Even if refusal to admit photographs was
error, no prejudice resulted to defendant where
the evidence was cumulative and could have
added nothing to defendant's case. Godesky v.
Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984).

—Exclusion.
When evidence is excluded by the trial court,
any error which may have resulted from such
exclusion is cured when the substance of the
evidence is later admitted through some other
means. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah
1983).
—Harmless error.
Where there was no likelihood that the testimony in question had any substantial bearing
on the outcome of the trial, it was not a cause
for reversal. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20
Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968).
Admission of hearsay testimony connecting
defendant with the crime was not prejudicial
where there was other testimony connecting
the defendant to the crime adduced before the
hearsay testimony. State v. Gardunio, 652 P.2d
1342 (Utah 1982).
The improper admission of hearsay evidence
was harmless error where the exclusion of such
evidence was not likely to produce a different
result. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111
(Utah 1982).
Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress
certain identification evidence was not a ruling
upon which error can be predicated where
there was other ample evidence of the defendant's culpability. State v. Bullock, 699 ?&
753 (Utah 1985).
Trial court's error in restricting defense
counsel's cross-examination of the prosecution's key witness concerning bias was harmless, where the jury had sufficient information
to fully appraise the witness's biases and motivations. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah
1987).
Admission of improper impeachment evidence was not prejudicial error, where the testimony did not bear directly on whether defendant did or did not do any of the acts witp
which he was charged, and there was no toolcation that the testimony improperly tofl°*
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEBRA LARSEN,

SPECIAL VERDICT
CASE NO. 940903949

Plaintiff,
vs.
HELINDA JOHNSON,
Defendant.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of
the evidence.

If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of

the issue presented, answer "yes."

If you find the evidence is so

equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against
the issue presented, answer "no." Also, any damages assessed must
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
1.

Was

the

defendant,

Melinda

Johnson,

negligent

in

performing any one or more of the specific acts of negligence

z

alleged by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:
2.

Yes

No

Was the defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the

injuries sustained by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:

Yes

No /(

iCt

-2-

3.

If you have answered both Questions 1 and 2 "yes," state

the amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the
plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained of. If
such

questions were not answered

"yes," do not answer this

question.
Special Damages

$

General Damages

$
TOTAL

Dated this l~J

$

day of April, 1996.

FOREPERSON

f

0 0 0 2 3S
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Andrea C. Alcabes, USB No. 32
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
Attorneys for Defendant
910 Kearns Building
13 6 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-3627
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEBRA LARSEN,
Plaintiff,

:

JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

:

Civil No, 940903949

:

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

vs.
MELINDA JOHNSON,
Defendant.

The above entitled matter came on for trial to a jury with
the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, commencing on the 15th
day of April, 1996, and continuing through the 17th day of April,
1996.

The matter was submitted to the jury on April 17, 1996 on

special verdict interrogatories, which were answered in pertinent
part as follows:
1.

Was

the

defendant,

Melinda

Johnson,

negligent

in

performing any one or more of the specific acts of negligence
alleged by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:
2.

Yes

X

No

Was the defendantf s negligence a proximate cause of the

injuries sustained by the plaintiff?
-1-

ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

The jury was polled and the above mentioned answers were
unanimous.
The court having directed that a verdict enter in accordance
with the jury's answer to the special verdict interrogatories, it
is
HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is entered
in

favor

of

the

defendant

plaintiff

of

no

plaintiff

is

hereby

cause

of

Melinda
action

dismissed

and

the

and

,

against

complaint

with prejudice/

defendant in the amount of ^ V7,i(a . & 4-

-2-

Johnson

costs

the

of

the

to

the

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on April 23, 1996, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Terry M. Plant, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
j -

r~

-3-

Tab 4

TERRY M. PLANT, #2610
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180)
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEBRA LARSEN,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
MELINDA JOHNSON,
Defendant.

Civil No. 940903949PI
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant,
Debra Larsen, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment
of the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson entered on the 9th day of May,
1996.

The appeal is taken from the entire judgment.
DATED this

day of May, 1996.
N, EPPERSON & SMITH

>LANT
Attorhey for Plaintiff /Appellant
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, postage prepaid, this ^
May, 1996, to the following:
Andrea C. Alcabes
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
Attorneys for Defendant
910 Kearns Building
136 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

TMPtlrj/93-651.36

-2-

day of
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A

THAT WOULD BE CORRECT.

Q

OKAY.

WOULD IT BE CORRECT THAT AT THAT

TIME, IN JULY OF 1992, YOU WOULD HAVE SAID THAT YOU AVOIDED
THINGS LIKE LOADING AND UNLOADING YOUR DISHWASHER AND
PICKING UP YOUR LITTLE GIRL AND THINGS THAT MIGHT HURT YOUR
BACK?
A

THAT'S TRUE.

Q

IS IT TRUE THAT YOU SETTLED YOUR LAWSUIT

FROM THE FIRST ACCIDENT?
A

THAT'S TRUE.

Q

IS IT TRUE THAT YOU RECEIVED $172,000.00 IN

SETTLEMENT OF YOUR CLAIMS IN THAT LAWSUIT?
MR. PLANT:

YOUR HONOR, JUST FOR THE RECORD, I

WOULD LODGE AN OBJECTION FOR RELEVANCE.
THE COURT:

THE OBJECTION IS NOTED.

IT'S OVER-

RULED.
A
SONALLY?

(BY THE WITNESS)

DID I RECEIVE THAT PER-

(BY MS. ALCABES)

IS THAT HOW MUCH THE

NO.
Q

SETTLEMENT WAS FOR?
A

THAT'S TRUE.

Q

AND YOU'VE HAD TO PAY SOME ATTORNEYS FEES

AND OTHER EXPENSES; IS THAT CORRECT?
A

QUITE A FEW OTHER EXPENSES, THAT'S CORRECT.

Q

IS IT TRUE THAT THE DATE, THAT THE DAY THAT

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.

(M*0 4 4 3
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